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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

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Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY





INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Soviet Moves to Strengthen the "Peace" Campaign

Since the Soviet peace feelers on Korea beginning early in 1951, there have been strong indications of shrewd if unsubstantial efforts by the USSR to back up its perennial "peace" campaign with actions outside the propaganda field. These maneuvers have involved no real concessions by the Soviet Union, and meanwhile its military buildup continues with no apparent slackening.

The latest Soviet efforts may be designed solely to capitalize on the USSR's initiative in contributing to a settlement of the Korean war. The evidence suggests, however, a more far-reaching campaign to persuade susceptible non-Communist governments that a costly Western alliance against the Soviet Union is no longer necessary. Specific targets would be Western rearmament and related economic policies.

During July two prominent Soviet wartime leaders, Marshal Zhukov and Vice-Admiral Kuznetsov, former Navy Minister, were "unveiled" again by the Kremlin after several years of obscurity. Both of them, aside from being competent professional military men, had records of cooperation with the Western Allies during the war. Their reappearance may be connected with the newly-adopted Soviet tactics in the "peace" campaign.

Deputy Foreign Minister Malik used an interview with a visiting British Quaker delegation in late July to stress the Soviet Union's readiness to enter into "businesslike" negotiations on major world issues, and its alleged desire for an improvement in international relations. The attention given to the British Quakers, the establishment of a new Soviet English-language publication stressing "cooperation and friendship," and the promise to print Foreign Secretary Morrison's remarks in Prayda are examples of the new tactics adopted by the Kremlin, aimed particularly at the Anglo-American powers.

Aside from a possible willingness to settle the Korean war, the only evidence so far of a change in Soviet foreign policy is in the trade and cultural fields, and here the USSR has been committed to no concessions of importance. If the Kremlin had been disposed to make





concessions, the preliminary conference of the Foreign Ministers' deputies in Paris would have afforded a suitable opportunity to seek a genuine relaxation of tension in Europe. The USSR, however, merely used the meetings for propaganda purposes from March until June, when the conference finally broke down.

In mid-July, the Soviet Union accepted a long-standing invitation to attend technical discussions on improving East-West trade sponsored by the UN Economic Commission for Europe. Acceptance of this invitation -- on the surface a sign of cooperativeness -- may be a new tactic intended to weaken Western controls on exports to the Soviet orbit, which the USSR has attempted, with diminishing success, to accomplish in bilateral negotiations.

Unusual Soviet cultural activities during the past few months include participation in the Milan International Fair of April for the first time in sixteen years, in the Brussels Music Festival held in May, and in the recent Florence Music Festival. The Mayor of Moscow also attended the 2,000th Anniversary celebration of the founding of Paris in early July. Finally, the USSR announced its intention to participate in the 1952 Olympic games at Helsinki, which would mark its first appearance in the Olympics.

These cultural activities are a departure from the policy instituted in the Soviet Union in 1946 of cutting off Western contacts in order to tighten political controls over the Russian people, which had been relaxed during World War II. Their ultimate purpose is still unclear.

